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Dynamis and Energeia in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
This paper offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s concepts of dynamis and energeia 
(commonly translated as potentiality and actuality), and of the thematic 
progression of Metaphysics IX. I first raise the question of where motion fits in 
Aristotle’s categories and argue that the locus of motion in the system of categories 
are the categories of doing and suffering, which is why dynamis and energeia in 
respect of motion can also be understood as the dynamis and energeia of doing and 
suffering. Next, I argue that the analogy that Aristotle draws in IX.6 is an analogy 
between the dynamis and energeia of doing and suffering and the dynamis and 
energeia of substance. Finally, I try to show that it is this analogy between the 
kinetic and non-kinetic variants of dynamis and energeia—and not the distinction 
between end-inclusive and end-exclusive activities—that provides the key to 
understanding the structure of Metaphysics IX. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle states several times that being is said in many ways. 
According to Aristotle, being has four general senses, one of which subdivides into 
eight (or however many categories there are).1 The four general senses of being are (i) 
accidental being, (ii) being as said of the categories, (iii) being as dynamis and energeia 
(often translated as potentiality and actuality), and (iv) being as truth. This paper 
explores one of the ways in which (ii) and (iii) are related: I argue that Aristotle draws 
an analogy between the dynamis and energeia pertaining to the categories of doing and 
suffering and the dynamis and energeia pertaining to the category of substance. Because 
their interpretation is precisely what is at stake, I will leave the terms dynamis and 
energeia untranslated for the most part of this paper. 
Aristotle begins Metaphysics IX with a discussion of dynamis and energeia ‘in 
respect of motion’ (kata kinēsin), adding immediately that there is more to dynamis and 
energeia than this ‘kinetic’ sense, that ‘dynamis and energeia extend further (epi pleon) 
than the mere sphere of motion’ (IX.1, 1046a1–2).2 The text therefore implies a fourfold 
distinction between (i) dynamis in respect of motion (dynamis kata kinēsin), (ii) 
energeia in respect of motion (energeia kata kinēsin), (iii) dynamis that extends further 
(dynamis epi pleon), and (iv) energeia that extends further (energeia epi pleon). Later in 
the text (IX.6, 1048a36–1048b4), Aristotle offers the following analogy: what (i) is to 
(ii) is what (iii) is to (iv). This much is agreed by most commentators. What I would like 
to add to this is that both the kata kinēsin-epi pleon distinction in IX.1 and the analogy 
in IX.6 have a categorial basis. 
I argue for this interpretation by discussing passages where motion is treated as a 
category of its own—namely, as a joint name for the categories of doing and 
suffering—and I suggest that this would explain why Aristotle refers to dynamis in 
respect of motion subsequently as the dynamis of doing and suffering. Next, I examine 
passages in IX.3 and XII.4–5 where the role of the categories is explicit, which passages 
therefore provide further support for the interpretation according to which, as Makin 
puts it, dynamis and energeia ‘apply analogously in different categories’ (Aristotle: 
Metaphysics Book Θ, 129; emphasis in the original). Building on these insights, I try to 
emphasize the role of the categories in understanding the thematic progression of 
Metaphysics IX, in which book, I argue, Aristotle begins with the dynamis and energeia 
of doing and suffering and proceeds to the dynamis and energeia of substance. I argue 
finally that despite what has been maintained by several scholars, Aristotle’s division of 
activities into those that are end-inclusive and those that are end-exclusive does not 
pertain directly to the kata kinēsin-epi pleon distinction in IX.1 and the analogy in 
IX.6.3 
2. MOTION AS DOING AND SUFFERING 
In the central books of the Metaphysics, Aristotle examines the different senses of 
being. Since one of the four senses of being is being as dynamis and energeia, Aristotle 
devotes Metaphysics IX to its analysis. The book begins with a discussion of dynamis 
and energeia ‘in respect of motion’ (kata kinēsin), but the text does not offer a 
clarification of this phrase. What Aristotle does tell us here is that there is more to 
dynamis and energeia than this ‘kinetic’ sense, that ‘dynamis and energeia extend 
further than the mere sphere of motion’ (IX.1, 1046a1–2).4 Aristotle states moreover 
that this kinetic type of dynamis and energeia is not the most useful, in the sense that it 
is not what is truly being sought (IX.1, 1045b36–1046a1). Later in the text, Aristotle 
offers an analogy (IX.6, 1048a36–1048b4), which shall be examined in section 5 of the 
paper. Because the kata kinēsin-epi pleon distinction in IX.1 and the analogy in IX.6 
involve a contrast between the kinetic and non-kinetic variants of dynamis and energeia, 
however, we must address the question of what it means for dynamis and energeia to be 
kinetic. 
In the Physics and the Metaphysics, Aristotle provides a definition of motion5—
the entelecheia of the dynaton as such (commonly translated as ‘the actuality of what is 
potential as such’)—which is a definition that applies equally to the four motions 
(generation/corruption, alteration, growth/diminution, and locomotion).6 For example, 
building is a motion that can be understood as the entelecheia of the buildable qua 
buildable (Physics III.1, 201a16–18). Likewise, the entelecheia of the healable as such 
is healing. This definition of motion has been much debated in the literature, but I will 
not discuss it here for the following reasons. First and foremost, the definiens consists of 
the very terms that I am trying to understand in the present study, so to examine the 
definition of motion would be, for my purposes, to put the cart before the horse.7 
Second, the precise interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of motion is orthogonal to the 
question of where motion fits in Aristotle’s categories, and it is this question that the 
present study aims to focus on. Note, for example, that commentators sometimes debate 
whether Aristotle’s definition of motion should be understood as the actuality of what is 
potential as such or as the actualization of what is potential as such, but I would like to 
stress that whatever the case may be, one may still raise the question concerning the 
locus of this actuality or actualization in the system of categories. Brentano’s discussion 
of motion is a case in point. In his doctoral dissertation, he provides a lengthy 
discussion of the different ways in which one can interpret Aristotle’s definition of 
motion (On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, 34–48), but his later claim that 
motion is factually identical to the categories of doing and suffering (ibid., 87) is 
extraneous to the aforementioned interpretations. 
Where does motion fit in the system of categories? For example, a horse is a 
substance, a size is a quantity, and a colour is a quality,8 but what about motion? On the 
face of it, this does not seem to be a difficult question because there are a few passages 
that suggest that motion is a category of its own. Granted, motion is not included in the 
canonical list of categories, not even in the Categories (1b26–7) and the Topics 
(103b22–4) where we find the most complete list of the categories. Nonetheless, there 
are several passages that include motion among the categories. Before proceeding 
further, let us take a closer look at these passages. 
In Metaphysics VII.4, Aristotle writes: ‘But since there are compounds of 
substance with the other categories (for there is a substrate for each category, e.g. for 
quality, quantity, time, place, and motion), we must inquire whether there is a formula 
of the essence of each of them’ (1029b22–25). Here the inclusion of motion among the 
categories may seem surprising, but more surprising still is another passage where 
Aristotle offers a bifurcation of motion into kinein (moving) and kineisthai (being 
moved): ‘For being, as we have divided it in other works, signifies now what a thing is, 
now quality, now quantity, now time, and again some of it consists in kineisthai and 
kinein’ (Eudemian Ethics I.8, 1217b27–29).9 According to Menn, in these and several 
other passages motion is the name of a category. As he puts it: 
We can best interpret Aristotle’s analogy between κίνησις and οὐσία [in IX.6] if 
we recognize that κίνησις, like οὐσία, is the name of a category: although it is not 
on the canonical list of categories in the Categories, Aristotle clearly refers to a 
category of κίνησις in Metaphysics 1029b22–25, 1054a4–6, 1069a21–22, and 
1071al–2: this is what is elsewhere divided into the categories of ποιεῖν and 
πάσχειν. (‘The Origins of Aristotle’s Concept of Ἐνέργεια’, 107) 
In his commentary on the Metaphysics, Aquinas likewise argues for the identity of 
kinēsis to doing and suffering: ‘For there is some subject of each of them, namely, of 
quality, quantity, when, where, and also of motion, in which are included both action 
and being acted upon’ (In VII Metaphysicorum, lect. 3, n. 1315). Elsewhere he writes, 
‘For it is clear that both action and passion are motion; for each is the same as motion’ 
(In III Physicorum, lect. 5, n. 310). Mention has already been made of Brentano, who 
maintains similarly that motion is ‘factually identical’ to the categories of doing and 
suffering (On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, 87). Now, the fact (i) that there 
are a number of passages that count kinēsis as one of the categories, (ii) that there are 
others that count kinein and kineisthai, and (iii) that in none of these passages kinēsis, 
kinein, or kineisthai coexist with the categories of doing and suffering lend support to 
the line of commentary according to which kinēsis is used as a joint name for these two 
categories. It is important to note, moreover, that this interpretation is consistent with 
Aristotle’s own remark that there is no motion of the poioun (doer) or the paschon 
(sufferer) because there is no motion of motion. As he puts it: 
If the categories are classified as substance, quality, place, poiein or paschein, 
relation, quantity, there must be three kinds of movement—of quality, of quantity, 
of place. There is no movement in respect…of poioun and paschon, nor of mover 
and moved, because there is no movement of movement nor generation of 
generation, nor, in general, change of change.10 (Met. XI.12, 1068a8–16) 
In what follows, I will try to show that the question concerning the locus of motion in 
Aristotle’s categories is important for understanding the thematic progression of 
Metaphysics IX. More precisely, I will argue that the dynamis and energeia in respect of 
motion can also be understood as the dynamis and energeia of doing and suffering—or, 
in Aristotle’s own words, dynamis tou poiein kai paschein (IX.1, 1046a19–20). First, 
though, I would like to interject by providing a brief exposition of the terminology 
traditionally adopted in discussions concerning Aristotle’s concepts of dynamis, 
energeia, and entelecheia.11 
3. THE TRADITIONAL TERMINOLOGY 
When Aristotle provides his own definition of the soul at the beginning of De Anima 
II.1, he draws a distinction between what appear to be different kinds of entelecheia: 
namely, entelecheia as the mere possession of knowledge and entelecheia as the 
exercise of knowledge (De Anima II.1, 412a10–11). Later in the text, Aristotle employs 
this distinction when providing his definition of the soul: 
Now there are two kinds of entelecheia corresponding to knowledge and to the act 
of contemplating [i.e. the exercise of knowledge]. It is obvious that the soul is an 
entelecheia like knowledge; for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence 
of soul, and of these waking corresponds to the act of contemplating, sleeping to 
knowledge possessed but not employed…That is why the soul is an entelecheia of 
the first kind of a natural body having life potentially in it. (De Anima II.1, 
412a22–28) 
The closing sentence of this passage features the phrase entelecheia hē prōtē, the likes 
of which are traditionally referred to as ‘first actuality’. For example, Aquinas writes 
that ‘in Book II of The Soul [Aristotle] says that a soul is the first actuality of a natural 
organic body having life potentially’ (In VI Metaphysicorum, lect. 1, n. 1159). 
Elsewhere, Aquinas elaborates that ‘the body, complete with its soul, is potentially 
animate in the sense that, though it has its first actuality, it may lack the second’ (In II 
De anima, lect. 2, n. 241). 
Those who adopt this terminology say for example that knowledge is the first 
actuality and the act of contemplating is the second or that the (sensitive) soul is the first 
actuality and perceiving is the second. The idea here is that first actuality is itself a 
potentiality for a further actuality, as a result of which first actuality may also be called 
second potentiality.12 For example, knowledge is an actuality, but it is at the same time 
a potentiality for the exercise of knowledge, the latter of which must be understood as 
second actuality. The person who has mastered the French language has the first 
actuality but does not necessarily have the second actuality, that is, unless she is uttering 
French sentences right now. Similarly, virtues are the first actuality, the lifelong 
exercise of which is happiness. Therefore, without going into the details of Aristotle’s 
ethical theory (the question of external goods and so on), we may say that virtue is the 
first actuality and happiness is the second. 
In other words, what is at issue is not a simple twofold division between 
potentiality and actuality but rather a threefold distinction between (i) first potentiality, 
(ii) first actuality or second potentiality, and (iii) second actuality. I think that this way 
of understanding the text is correct, yet there is a sense in which confining ourselves to 
this terminology alone may result in turning a blind eye to the categorial foundations of 
the kata kinēsin-epi pleon distinction in IX.1 and the analogy in IX.6. One of the 
objectives of my interpretation, therefore, is to complement the traditional terminology, 
and this I try to do by emphasizing the role of the categories in the composition of 
Metaphysics IX.13 
4. CAPACITY AND ACTIVITY 
Mention has been made that Aristotle begins Metaphysics IX with the fourfold 
distinction between (i) dynamis in respect of motion (dynamis kata kinēsin), (ii) 
energeia in respect of motion (energeia kata kinēsin), (iii) dynamis that extends further 
(dynamis epi pleon), and (iv) energeia that extends further (energeia epi pleon). 
Aristotle defines the first of these as ‘the principle of change in another thing or in the 
thing itself as other’ (IX.1, 1046a11).14 While there are other senses of dynamis kata 
kinēsin, Aristotle states that it is the sense just mentioned that serves as the focal 
meaning. One of the other senses that depend on the focal meaning is the corresponding 
dynamis of the patient. The dynamis to move something else (or as something else) or 
be moved by something else (or as something else) is sometimes called a ‘power’,15 in 
which case Aristotle’s discussion at the beginning of Metaphysics IX concerns agent 
and passive powers.16 
In Metaphysics IX, Aristotle’s first examples of agent and passive powers are 
the dynamis for being burned and being crushed, which are passive powers, and the 
dynamis for heating and building, which are agent powers. Aristotle refers to these 
eventually as dynameis tou poiēsai ē tou pathein (1046a16–17), dynamis tou poiein kai 
paschein (1046a19–20), and hē tou poiēsai ē pathein dynamis (1046b25–26), i.e. the 
dynamis of doing and suffering.17 It is worth mentioning here that in the Categories, the 
examples Aristotle provides for the category of poiein are cutting and burning, and 
likewise the examples he gives for the category of paschein are being cut and being 
burned (Categories 4, 2a4). In Metaphysics IX, therefore, when Aristotle mentions the 
burnable (kauston) as something that has a passive capacity (IX.1, 1046a25), he is 
exploiting the familiar examples of burning (kaiein) and being burnt (kaiesthai). 
A point that needs to be stressed here is that there are four categories (substance, 
quality, quantity, and place) that are closely related to the four motions: (i) generation 
and corruption, (ii) alteration, (iii) growth and diminution, and (iv) locomotion (Physics 
III.1, 201a11–15).18 As Aristotle puts it in the Physics, ‘It is always with respect to 
(kata) substance or to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes changes’ 
(Physics III.1, 200b33–34). Note that the categories just mentioned are those in respect 
of which the change occurs and that they are therefore the categories where the effect of 
the motion is observed—which effect is produced by the joint activity of agent and 
passive powers. Let me try to demonstrate this with a couple of examples. 
As has just been mentioned, cutting and being cut are the examples Aristotle 
gives in the Categories for poiein and paschein. Assume, for example, that I am cutting 
some paper (doing) and that the paper is being cut (suffering). As a result of this doing 
and suffering, the paper will eventually end up acquiring a new size and therefore a new 
quantity. In other words, after this process has been completed, the paper will have 
acquired a new form in the category of quantity. This kind of motion would be referred 
to by Aristotle as diminution (phthisis). Likewise, assume that I am painting my wall 
(doing) and that it is being painted by me (suffering). As a result of the joint activity of 
the capacities of the agent and the patient, the wall will end up acquiring a new colour 
and therefore a new quality. This kind of motion would be referred to by Aristotle as 
alteration (alloiōsis). Many similar examples can be given, and what they show is that 
when we are dealing with motions such as building, teaching, cutting, painting, and so 
on, the doing and suffering take place with respect to (kata) the categories of substance, 
quality, quantity, or place, in which categories, moreover, the doing and suffering 
produce a lasting effect. But the fact that these motions take place with respect to the 
categories of substance, quality, quantity, or place should give us no reason to confuse 
motion with the categories with respect to which it takes place. It is worth noting in this 
context that at the end of his discussion of motion in Physics III.1–3, Aristotle describes 
motion as ‘the entelecheia of what can act and what can be acted on, as such’ (Physics 
III.3, 202b26–27). The entelecheia of what can act as such is an action (doing), just as 
the entelecheia of what can be acted on as such is a passion (suffering), and it is 
important that we distinguish this doing and suffering from the four categories with 
respect to which they take place. 
Let us now turn to perception. Perception is an example that Aristotle uses in two 
chapters (IX.3 and IX.5), both of which lie within the scope of text that by Aristotle’s 
own admission treats dynamis in respect of motion. Why is perception treated in this 
part of Metaphysics IX? I argue in what follows that this is because perception, too, 
must be understood as the joint activity of two correlated capacities: the dynamis of the 
agent (the sensible object) and that of the patient (the sensing subject). If this is right, it 
would only be natural for Aristotle to treat perception analogously to the way in which 
he treats other agent and passive powers, such as cutting and being cut. 
In the Physics, Aristotle writes that perception is a motion wherein the sense is 
affected in some respect (VII.2, 244b11–12). In the De Anima (II.12, 424a17–19), he 
explains perception as the reception of the sensible forms without the matter (to 
dektikon tōn aisthētōn eidōn aneu tēs hylēs). It is precisely this ‘receiving’ that Aristotle 
characterizes as a suffering when, in DA II.7–11, he provides an account of how each of 
the five senses relate to their particular objects. Near the end of this account (II.11, 
424a1), Aristotle states in no uncertain terms that perception is a kind of suffering (to 
gar aisthanesthai paschein ti estin). He adds in the next chapter that plants cannot 
perceive precisely because they are unable to partake in this kind of suffering, namely, 
without the matter; plants are only capable of, as Aristotle puts it, paschein meta tēs 
hylēs (II.12, 424b2). 
The characterization of perception as a kind of suffering is prevalent in 
commentaries on Aristotle’s philosophy of mind. In his commentary on the De Anima 
(In II De anima, lect. 23, n. 547), Aquinas maintains that perception is a kind of 
undergoing (sentire est pati quoddam). In the same way, Averroes states in his long 
commentary on the De Anima that ‘sensation is one of the passive powers’ and even 
more unambiguously that ‘affection is the genus of sensation’ (Long Commentary on 
the De Anima of Aristotle, 162). Likewise, Brentano writes, ‘We sense by being moved 
by the sensed object, hence by being affected’ (The Psychology of Aristotle, 54). 
Lennox points out in a similar fashion that ‘perception is a passive capacity, a being 
affected by an object of perception’ (Aristotle: On the Parts of Animals I–IV, 183; 
emphasis in the original). This view is held also by Kosman, according to whom the 
‘perceptual capacities, and the faculties of reason and thought as well, are potentialities 
of the sensitive and intelligent subject to be affected in certain ways, to be acted upon by 
the sensible and intelligible forms of objects in the world’ (‘Being Properly Affected’, 
66; emphasis in the original). 
Perception is characterized specifically as an affection because it is what we do; 
that is to say, we (the perceiving subjects) receive the sensible forms of the objects. In 
the terminology of the De Anima (I.1, 402b15–16), the object (to antikeimenon) of 
perception is that which is sensible (to aisthēton). Without going into the details of 
Aristotle’s account of perception—e.g. the role of the medium, the difference between 
the primary sense organ and the peripheral sense organs, the literalist vs. the spiritualist 
readings of Aristotle—the basic picture is that it is the sensible object that serves as the 
agent, which therefore has a capacity to act, just as the perceiving subject has a 
corresponding capacity to suffer. 
In sum, once we raise the question of where motion fits in Aristotle’s categories 
and answer that the locus of motion in the system of categories are the categories of 
doing and suffering, it becomes possible to understand why Aristotle’s treatment of 
dynamis in respect of motion involves instances of dynamis tou poiein (e.g. building) 
and dynamis tou paschein (e.g. perceiving). But there is another issue that needs to be 
discussed in this context: namely, there is a sense in which each suffering (perceiving, 
being cut, etc.) coincides with a doing. If the wall is being painted, somebody or 
something is painting it. If the bricks and boards are being arranged into a house, 
somebody or something is arranging them so. In fact, to take Aristotle’s own example in 
the Physics, the teaching performed by the teacher or the learning experienced by the 
student can be thought of as two different explanations of the same process from 
opposite poles. As Aristotle puts it: 
Hence there is a single actuality of both [i.e. of that which can move and that which 
can be moved] alike, just as one to two and two to one are the same interval, and 
the steep ascent and the steep descent are one—for these are one and the same, 
although their definitions are not one….This view has a dialectical difficulty. 
Perhaps it is necessary that there should be [a separate] actuality of the agent and of 
the patient. The one is agency and the other patiency; and the outcome and end of 
the one is an action, that of the other a passion….[But] it is not absurd that the 
actualization of one thing should be in another. Teaching is the activity of a person 
who can teach, yet the operation is performed in something.…There is nothing to 
prevent two things [e.g. the capacity to teach and the capacity to be taught] having 
one and the same actualization …. (Physics III.3, 202a18–202b9) 
In his commentary on the Physics, Aquinas writes that ‘it is clear that action and 
passion are not two motions but one and the same motion’ (In III Physicorum, lect. 5, n. 
314), despite the fact that the two have different definitions. Ford claims likewise that 
‘action and passion are two aspects of a single material reality, a transaction between 
the agent and patient’ (‘Action and Passion’, 15). Gill makes a similar point: ‘Action 
and passion are one in the way that the road from Athens to Thebes and the road from 
Thebes to Athens are one’ (Aristotle on Substance, 205). 
The idea here is that to each dynamis of suffering corresponds a dynamis of 
doing, and even though the former dynamis is distinct from the latter, their energeia is 
one and the same.19 The ability to teach is not identical to the ability to be taught; what 
is identical, rather, is the energeia of these agent and passive powers. Similarly, the 
dynamis to perceive and the dynamis to be perceived are distinct, but their energeia is 
one and the same. In a word, dynamis in respect of motion can also be understood as the 
dynamis of doing and suffering, in which case energeia in respect of motion can be 
understood as the exercise of this kind of dynamis. In what follows, I will call dynamis 
in respect of motion ‘capacity’ and energeia in respect of motion ‘activity’. More 
precisely, I will call dynamis of doing or suffering ‘capacity’ and energeia of doing or 
suffering ‘activity’.20 In the next section, I will argue that capacity and activity serve as 
two of the analogues in the analogy in IX.6. 
5. THE ANALOGY IN METAPHYSICS IX.6 
Aristotle begins Metaphysics IX with an analysis of the kinetic versions of dynamis and 
energeia (i.e. capacity and activity), and these, as we shall see, serve as two of the 
analogues in the analogy that Aristotle introduces in IX.6. In other words, capacity and 
activity serve as the A and B in the analogy according to which what A is to B is what C 
is to D. Note also, however, that Aristotle begins with agent and passive capacities 
because it is this kind of dynamis that he inherits from Plato. What is at issue here are 
on the one hand the capacity to do and on the other hand the capacity to suffer, which 
correspond, as the Stranger in the Sophist puts it, to the dynamis eis to poiein and the 
dynamis eis to pathein (247d–e). Similarly, in the Theaetetus (156a), Plato explains that 
there are two kinds of motion (tēs de kinēseōs dyo eidē), the one having the capacity to 
do, the other to suffer (dynamin de to men poiein echon, to de paschein). Hence, there is 
enough common ground between Plato and Aristotle on this issue that one can see why 
Aristotle would begin his discussion of dynamis with the sense of the term that he 
inherits from his teacher.21 
I propose that we understand the thematic progression of Metaphysics IX in the 
following way. Namely, Aristotle employs our understanding of agent and passive 
capacities, concepts that can already be found in Plato’s philosophy, as a stepping stone 
towards an understanding of the dynamis that extends further. Of course, to each kind of 
dynamis corresponds a different kind of energeia. Therefore, we have, on the one hand, 
agent and passive capacities and their joint exercise and, on the other hand, the dynamis 
that extends further and its corresponding energeia. Aristotle begins IX.6 with the 
following words: 
Since we have treated of the kind of dynamis which is related to kinēsis, let us 
discuss energeia, what and what sort of thing it is. In the course of our analysis it 
will also become clear, with regard to the dynaton, that we not only ascribe 
dynaton to that whose nature it is to move (kinein) something else or be moved 
(kineisthai) by something else, either without qualification or in some particular 
way, but also use the word in another sense, in the pursuit of which we have 
discussed these previous senses. (IX.6, 1048a25–30)  
It has been argued throughout this paper that the locus of motion in the system of 
categories are the categories of doing and suffering, which would explain why Aristotle 
refers to dynamis in respect of motion subsequently as dynameis tou poiēsai ē tou 
pathein (1046a16–17), dynamis tou poiein kai paschein (1046a19–20), and hē tou 
poiēsai ē pathein dynamis (1046b25–26). But the passage under discussion says more: 
we are told that the dynamis of doing and suffering is not the only dynamis; in fact, it is 
not the kind of dynamis that is the most useful for our purposes. What is more important 
for our purposes is the dynamis that extends further, but Aristotle doesn’t provide a 
definition for this particular dynamis or for its corresponding energeia; instead, he 
explicitly asks us not to demand a definition of everything but be content to grasp the 
analogy. As he puts it:   
[W]e must not seek a definition of everything but be content to grasp the 
analogy,—that as (i) that which is building is to that which is capable of building, 
so is (ii) the waking to the sleeping, and (iii) that which is seeing to that which has 
its eyes shut but has sight, and (iv) that which is shaped out of the matter to the 
matter, and (v) that which has been wrought to the unwrought. (IX.6, 1048a36–
1048b4) 
How should we parse out this analogy? In the light of our previous discussion, (i), (ii), 
and (iii) must belong together as instances of the dynamis and energeia of doing and 
suffering. In Metaphysics V.12, the building art (hē oikodomikē dynamis) is 
characterized as a principle of motion (archē kinēseōs) in another (1019a15–16), so it is 
an agent capacity. More precisely, the capacity to build is a capacity to make (dynamis 
tou poiein), and it belongs to builder, just as the capacity to be built belongs to the 
material from which the house is made. It has already been argued, moreover, that the 
capacity to see—and likewise the capacity to hear, smell, taste, and touch—must be 
understood as a passive capacity (dynamis tou paschein) and that the agent capacity in 
this case belongs to the visible (or, more generally, the sensible) object. That leaves us 
with (ii). At the beginning of the De Somno, Aristotle writes that ‘waking and sleep 
appertain to the same part of an animal, inasmuch as they are opposites, and sleep is 
evidently a privation of waking’ (453b25–26) and adds that waking ‘consists in nothing 
else than the exercise of sense-perception’ (454a4–5). A few passages later, Aristotle 
says that ‘sleep is, in a certain way, or, as it were, a motionlessness bond, imposed on 
sense-perception, while its loosening or remission constitutes the being awake’ 
(454b25–27). In other words, waking must be understood as a releasement (lysis) into 
activity of the capacity for perception, which means that the relation between sleep and 
waking corresponds to the relation between the capacity for perception, which remains 
unenacted as long as the animal remains asleep, and the exercise of this capacity.  
In sum, my point is that the dynamis to build or to perceive are instances of what 
is referred to in IX.1 as dynamis tou poiein kai paschein (IX.1, 1046a19–20), which in 
turn corresponds to the agent and passive capacities that we find in Plato’s dialogues the 
Theaetetus (156a) and the Sophist (247d–e). If this is right, (i)–(iii) together comprise 
one side of the analogy, in which case the other side of the analogy must consist of (iv)–
(v). For similar reasons, Menn (‘The Origins of Aristotle’s Concept of Ἐνέργεια’, 
106ff.) also divides the analogy into (i)–(iii) and (iv)–(v). Likewise, Makin argues that 
what is at issue here are ‘three pairs of cases framed in terms of the change-capacity 
relation which was the focus of Θ1–5’ and ‘two pairs…which concern the 
substance-matter relation’ and adds that (i)–(iii) ‘illustrate the change–capacity 
relation’, while (iv)–(v) illustrate ‘the substance–matter relation’ (Aristotle: 
Metaphysics Book Θ, 137). Beere, who offers a detailed analysis of the analogy (Doing 
and Being, 169–219), also understands the passage under discussion to draw a 
distinction between what he calls ‘the activity-like cases of energeia and the 
actuality-like cases of energeia’ (ibid., 200). Elsewhere, he writes that this analogy is 
meant ‘to unify cases of doing (both changes and non‐change activities) and cases that 
are static’ (‘Activity, actuality, and analogy’, 878). 
I agree with much of what is said here, but I believe that more emphasis needs 
be placed on the categorial basis of the division of the analogy into (i)–(iii) and (iv)–
(v). Again, (i)–(iii) are instances of the dynamis and energeia of doing and suffering, 
whereas (iv)–(v) are instances of the dynamis and energeia of substance. Some things, 
Aristotle concludes, ‘are as kinēsis to dynamis, and the others as substance to some sort 
of matter’ (IX.6, 1048b8–9). Thus, Aristotle’s remarks involve a contrast between the 
dynamis and energeia of motion and the dynamis and energeia of substance.22 As we 
shall see, another virtue of this interpretation is that it is consistent with passages in IX.3 
and XII.4–5 where Aristotle talks about how the concepts of dynamis and energeia 
apply analogously in different categories. 
6. AN INTERPRETATION OF EPI PLEON 
In the earlier sections of the paper, I tried to advance an interpretation of Metaphysics 
IX that places emphasis on the role of the categories. Additional support for this 
interpretation comes from a passage in IX.3: 
Therefore it is possible that a thing may be capable of being and not be, and 
capable of not being and yet be, and similarly with the other kinds of predicate (epi 
tōn allōn katēgoriōn); it may be capable of walking and yet not walk, or capable of 
not walking and yet walk. (1047a20–24) 
In this passage, Aristotle begins with the dynamis and energeia of substance—‘a thing 
may be capable of being and not be’—but extends it to the other categories, and the 
example he gives is walking, which belongs to the category of doing.23 Here, the phrase 
epi tōn allōn katēgoriōn (in the case of other categories) appears to be parallel to the epi 
pleon mentioned in IX.1, in which case ‘extending further’ can be understood to have a 
categorial basis. The analogy in IX.6 begins with the categories of doing and suffering 
(i.e. the category of motion), so the other category is substance. The IX.3 passage, in 
contrast, begins with substance, so the other category is doing. What is important to 
realize is that similar examples are given in the aforementioned passages in IX.3 and 
IX.6. In the former, Aristotle begins with substance, so the explicitly-mentioned allai 
katēgoriai include categories such as doing (e.g. walking); in the latter, Aristotle begins 
with the categories of doing and suffering and then proceeds to substance. If this is 
right, in IX.6 Aristotle proceeds from the dynamis and energeia of motion to the 
dynamis and energeia of substance, whereas in IX.3, he proceeds from the dynamis and 
energeia of substance to the dynamis and energeia of motion. 
Another advantage of this interpretation is that it agrees with various passages in 
Metaphysics XII.4–5, which also discuss, as Makin puts it, how dynamis and energeia 
‘apply analogously in the different categories’ (Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Θ, 129; 
emphasis in the original). In one of these passages Aristotle writes the following: 
The causes and the principles of different things are in a sense different, but in a 
sense, if one speaks universally and analogically, they are the same for all. For we 
might raise the question whether the principles and elements are different or the 
same for substances and for relatives, and similarly in the case of each of the 
categories. (XII.4, 1070a31–35) 
In this passage Aristotle mentions neither dynamis nor energeia, but in the next chapter 
he adds that ‘analogically identical things are principles, i.e., energeia and dynamis’ 
(XII.5, 1071a4–5). I agree with Makin that, taken together, these passages suggest that 
dynamis and energeia apply analogously in different categories. What can we conclude 
from these? If we understand the distinction between the kinetic and non-kinetic 
variants of dynamis and energeia in IX.1 in categorial terms, and if we likewise grant 
that the analogy in IX.6 has a categorial basis, our interpretation would be in line with 
passages in IX.3 and XII.4–5, in which passages Aristotle explicitly mentions the 
categories when talking about the (analogical) extension of dynamis and energeia.24 
This leaves us with one more point to be discussed, which is the distinction that 
Aristotle draws in Metaphysics IX.6 and Nicomachean Ethics X.4 between 
end-inclusive and end-exclusive activities. My goal will be to show that this distinction 
is not pertinent to the thematic progression of Metaphysics IX. 
7. THE ENERGEIA-KINĒSIS DISTINCTION 
In this last section, I will critically examine the claim that Aristotle’s division of 
activities into those that are end-inclusive and those that are end-exclusive pertains 
directly to the thematic progression of Metaphysics IX. I will have to say three things 
about this position. First, I will argue that it is incompatible with the categorial 
interpretation of the analogy in IX.6, an interpretation for which we have strong 
evidence. Next, I will point out that because the manuscript evidence for the IX.6 
passage containing the energeia-kinēsis distinction is weak, it would be wrong to rely 
too much on this passage in interpreting Metaphysics IX. Finally, I will try to draw 
insights from Aristotle’s discussion of perception and argue that perception is an 
end-inclusive activity that wouldn’t have been treated in IX.1–5 if these chapters were 
confined to a discussion of end-exclusive activities. 
Let us first try to understand what is meant by the energeia-kinēsis distinction. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, in a passage where he tries to determine the ontological 
status of pleasure, Aristotle writes the following:  
For every motion (e.g. that of building) takes time and is for the sake of an end, 
and is complete when it has made what it aims at. It is complete, therefore, only in 
the whole time or at the final moment. In their parts and during the time they 
occupy, all motions are incomplete…So, too, in the case walking and all other 
motions. (Nicomachean Ethics X.4, 1174a29) 
These remarks suggest that as long as somebody is walking, the telos has not been 
reached yet, which is another way of saying that each and every part of walking is 
necessarily atelēs.25 What is important about these activities is that they have their ends 
outside themselves. For example, being in Athens is the end of walking towards Athens, 
but the two cannot co-exist: I cannot be walking towards Athens if I am already in it, 
just as it cannot be the case that I am in Athens as long as I am walking towards the city. 
The goal of walking towards Athens, in fact, is to no longer be walking towards Athens, 
which is why all such activities have what Kosman calls a ‘self-destructive character’ 
(‘Aristotle’s Definition of Motion’, 58). In Metaphysics IX.6, Aristotle distinguishes 
these activities from activities that are at each moment complete: 
E.g. at the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have 
understood, are thinking and have thought: but it is not true that at the same time 
we are learning and have learnt, or are being cured and have been cured…Of these, 
then, we must call the one set kinēseis, and the other energeiai. (1048b23–28) 
Commenting on the relation of energeia to kinēsis, Ross draws attention to 
terminological inconsistencies in Aristotle; according to Ross, Aristotle uses the same 
name for the genus (characterized alternatively as kinēsis or energeia) and the two 
species of the genus.26 Menn argues, rather, that energeia is the genus, while complete 
and incomplete energeia are its two species: ‘Κίνησις is a subclass of ἐνέργεια…and so 
is not properly contradistinguished from ἐνέργεια…Aristotle is not here denying (what 
elsewhere he plainly affirms) that κινήσεις are ἐνέργειαι, any more than I deny that men 
are animals when I say “this kind of thing I call an animal, that a man”’ (‘The Origins of 
Aristotle’s Concept of Ἐνέργεια’, 106, n. 43).27 In Menn’s example, animal is the 
genus, while rational and irrational animal are its species, and in the above passage, the 
two species of the genus energeia are complete and incomplete energeia. Sometimes we 
distinguish man from animal, in which case we are not denying that man is, properly 
speaking, a distinct kind of animal; what we mean to say is that man is different from 
other animals, namely, from those that are irrational. Despite their differences, Ross, 
Menn, and Beere share the view that what is at issue here are (i) a genus and (ii) 
different species of the genus. Despite terminological inconsistencies in Aristotle, then, 
these commentators agree that there is a certain genus, whose species can be 
distinguished from one another by some differentia. 
The basic idea behind the energeia-kinēsis distinction is that some activities 
have their ends within (e.g. seeing, understanding, thinking, living well, being happy), 
while others don’t (e.g. making thin, learning, being cured, walking, building). And 
there is a way to tell the one kind of activities from the other. The question Aristotle 
wants us to consider is whether the present tense of these verbs implies the perfect 
tense. For example, does somebody who is seeing imply a person who has seen? Does 
somebody who is learning imply a person who has learned? In the former case yes, in 
the latter, no. 
On one common interpretation of the energeia-kinēsis distinction, the present 
does not imply the perfect in cases where what is at issue is an activity the completion 
of which requires time.28 As Halper puts it, end-inclusive activities ‘are timeless in the 
sense that their definitions need not include time’ (One and Many in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, 209). In other words, unlike walking from Thebes to Athens, which takes 
time to complete (and when the journey is complete, the walking will have ceased), 
seeing red is at each moment complete. According to Kosman, it is because an 
end-inclusive activity ‘does not need to await any further development to perfect or 
complete its being that it is complete and perfect at each and every present moment of 
its duration’ (The Activity of Being, 42). If I am seeing red, this entails, in Aristotle’s 
view, that I have seen red, i.e. nobody can claim that I have not seen red if I am seeing it 
right now. In other words, seeing red has at each moment its telos within; it is at each 
moment entelēs. 
There have been commentators who maintain, for various reasons, that the 
division of activities into those that are end-inclusive and those that are end-exclusive 
pertains directly to the thematic progression of Metaphysics IX.29 Other commentators 
disagree with this view, and I believe they are right. Let us remember Aristotle’s 
analogy in IX.6: 
‘[A]s (i) that which is building is to that which is capable of building, so is (ii) the 
waking to the sleeping, and (iii) that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut 
but has sight, and (iv) that which is shaped out of the matter to the matter, and (v) 
that which has been wrought to the unwrought’ (IX.6, 1048a37–1048b4). 
If this analogy were structured in terms of the energeia-kinēsis distinction, we should 
not expect (i)–(iii) to belong together, for (i) exemplifies an end-exclusive activity 
(because to build does not entail to have built), whereas (ii) and (iii)—or at least (iii), 
which is unambiguous—exemplify end-inclusive activities (because to perceive entails 
to have perceived). This would explain why commentators have maintained that (i)–(iii) 
do not belong together (Halper, One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 209) or that 
(i)–(iii) do not initially seem to belong together (Gill, Aristotle on Substance, 215).30 
This way of understanding the text, according to which the unity of (i)–(iii) is either 
denied or believed to be a complex issue, is therefore incompatible with the categorial 
interpretation of the analogy, for on this interpretation there are no grounds to doubt the 
unity of (i)–(iii) because they all concern the same categories, namely, the categories of 
doing and suffering. In section 5 of the paper, I explained that (i)–(iii) must belong 
together because building, waking, and seeing all fall under the categories of doing and 
suffering, the dynamis and energeia of which Aristotle means to compare with the 
dynamis and energeia of substance. 
The categorial interpretation of the analogy that I advanced in this paper is in 
line with the view held not only by commentators according to whom the 
energeia-kinēsis distinction does not belong in the text of IX.6 (more on this shortly) 
but also by commentators according to whom the energeia-kinēsis distinction is a finer 
distinction that is not directly pertinent to the analogy. According to Makin, for 
example, what is at issue in (i)–(iii) is an ‘undifferentiated notion of change’ (Aristotle: 
Metaphysics Book Θ, 134). Makin adds in the next lines that Aristotle’s ‘conclusions [in 
IX.1–5] concerning capacities and their exercise will not be sensitive to the more 
fine-grained distinction’ between end-inclusive and end-exclusive activities (ibid., 135), 
and he concludes eventually that ‘the 1048b18–35 distinction between change and 
actuality is not crucial to Met. Θ’ (ibid., 154). For similar reasons, Witt argues that if 
‘one makes the distinction between motions and activities crucial [here]…then it is very 
difficult to interpret [Aristotle’s] examples, which include both motions like building 
and activities like seeing’ (Ways of Being, 134, n. 20). In the same vein, Menn 
maintains that the ‘distinction between those activities that may be called κινήσεις and 
those activities that should only be called ἐνέργειαι is a relatively fine point’ (‘The 
Origins of Aristotle’s Concept of Ἐνέργεια’, 106), and Beere points out likewise that he 
‘does not accept [the] interpretation’ that ‘the distinction between change and energeia 
is important in Theta 6’ (Doing and Being, 228). In sum, I agree with the conclusions 
reached by these commentators (who appeal to Aristotle’s examples as evidence that the 
energeia-kinēsis distinction is a finer distinction that is not directly pertinent to the 
analogy in IX.6) because, once again, the interpretation of the analogy that has been 
advanced in this paper is one that distinguishes sharply between (i)–(iii) and (iv)–(v), 
which distinction has a categorial basis. 
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the manuscript evidence for the 
IX.6 passage containing the energeia-kinēsis distinction is weak.31 This is not to suggest 
that Aristotle never draws such a distinction; mention has been made that Aristotle 
draws a similar distinction in Nicomachean Ethics X.4. Note, however, that one may 
believe that the distinction between end-inclusive and end-exclusive activities is an 
Aristotelian distinction and still question its inclusion in IX.6. For example, Halper, 
according to whom the distinction is significant for the composition of Metaphysics IX, 
concedes nevertheless that the passage in question is one that is ‘absent from the best 
manuscripts’ (One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 209). Likewise, Kosman 
concedes the ‘high probability that the passage is an interloper’ but adds that this ‘raises 
little difficulty’ for his position (The Activity of Being, 259–260, n. 2.). Granted, even if 
the passage has been inserted by an editor, this would not show that the distinction is 
not an Aristotelian distinction or even that it is an insignificant distinction, but such a 
concession would take away from the original appeal of attempts to treat the 
energeia-kinēsis distinction as the key to understanding the structure of Metaphysics IX. 
In sum, the manuscript status of the passage containing the energeia-kinēsis distinction 
cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for a particular way of reading the text, but it 
should at least caution us against relying too much on this passage in our interpretations 
of Metaphysics IX. 
Finally, and I think most importantly, those who hold the view that Aristotle’s 
division of activities into those that are end-inclusive and those that are end-exclusive is 
significant for the composition of Metaphysics IX will have a difficult time explaining 
why perception, which is an end-inclusive activity that happens to be one of the 
analogues in the analogy, is mentioned twice in IX.1–5. In IX.3, for example, whether 
the capacity for perception exists when it is not being enacted and likewise whether 
sensible qualities exist when they are not being perceived are some of the central 
questions in Aristotle’s confrontation with the Megarian philosophers. Perception is also 
mentioned at the very beginning of IX.5, which is generally believed to serve as a 
summary of the earlier chapters. The point that I wish to make here is the following: 
insofar as IX.1–5 does not include a discussion of the epi pleon variant of dynamis, the 
capacity to perceive must be kinetic. But if the kinetic variant of dynamis were to be 
interpreted as the dynamis pertaining to end-exclusive activities, which some believe is 
the correct interpretation, perception too would have to count as an end-exclusive 
activity. Quite the contrary, however, it is clear that Aristotle considers perception to be 
an end-inclusive activity (De Sensu 6, 446b2–3; Metaphysics IX.6, 1048b23; IX.6, 
1048b33–34). There is a problem here, then, and the problem has to do with the 
interpretation of the kinetic version of dynamis as the dynamis pertaining to 
end-exclusive activities. The categorial interpretation of dynamis kata kinēsin is not 
plagued by this problem because it would not be surprising for Aristotle to include a 
discussion of perception here if the kind of dynamis treated in IX.1–5 is the dynamis of 
doing and suffering and if perception is a suffering, as I have argued is the case. 
On a final note, most commentators agree that there are terminological 
inconsistencies on the part of Aristotle, and I think that this is because Aristotle uses 
two terms to refer to three concepts. To distinguish clearly between these concepts, I 
call the genus ‘activity’ (a concept which I described as the joint exercise of correlative 
agent and passive capacities), while I call its species ‘end-inclusive activity’ and 
‘end-exclusive activity’. Among these, the term energeia refers sometimes to activity in 
general and sometimes to end-inclusive activity.32 The term kinēsis refers to 
end-exclusive activity, but if the arguments in this paper have been successful, it also 
refers to activity in general, which is in line with the terminology adopted by Makin, 
who talks about an ‘undifferentiated notion of change’ (Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Θ, 
134) that includes building and seeing, and likewise with the terminology adopted by 
Witt, who divides motion into ‘incomplete and complete motions’ (Ways of Being, 50). 
If kinēsis were confined to end-exclusive activity, we would not be able to explain why 
kinēsis is sometimes listed as a category (because not everything belonging under this 
category is end-exclusive) and why the capacity for perception, which is an instance of 
end-inclusive activity, is treated among the kinetic variants of dynamis. I am therefore 
in complete agreement with Ross, who writes that ‘Κίνησις and ἐνέργεια are species of 
something wider for which Aristotle has no name, and for which he uses now the name 
of one species, now that of the other’ (Aristotle’s Metaphysics, vol. 2, 251).33 What I 
would add to this is that the more specific difference between the two species of the 
genus (i.e. the difference between the end-inclusive and end-exclusive species) is not 
pertinent to the composition of Metaphysics IX. 
To facilitate further discussion of these issues, let me restate the conclusions of 
this paper as clearly as possible: (i) the locus of motion in Aristotle’s categories are the 
categories of doing and suffering, (ii) dynamis and energeia in respect of motion can 
also be understood as the dynamis and energeia of doing and suffering, (iii) 
Metaphysics IX begins with a discussion of the dynamis and energeia of doing and 
suffering and proceeds to a discussion of the dynamis and energeia of substance, and 
(iv) Aristotle’s distinction between end-inclusive and end-exclusive activities does not 
pertain directly to the thematic progression of Metaphysics IX.
 
ENDNOTES 
1 The clearest formulation of the fourfold division is in VI.2, 1026a33–1026b2, of the eightfold 
division in V.7, 1017a25–7. Note that while the latter is the most comprehensive list of the 
categories in the Metaphysics, the passages in Categories 4, 1b26–7 and Topics I.9, 103b22–4 
also include keisthai and echein, in which case we end up with ten categories instead of eight. 
2 For translations of Aristotle I follow Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The 
Revised Oxford Translation, sometimes with slight modifications. 
3 I owe this terminology (end-inclusive vs. end-exclusive) to David Charles (‘Comments on 
Aryeh Kosman’s The Activity of Being’), who in turn cites Alexander Mourelatos. 
4 Footnote here to rule out alternative explanations. 
5 Various formulations of the definition can be found in Physics III.1–3 and in Metaphysics 
XI.9. 
6 See especially Physics III.1, 201a11–15. If motion is from contrary to contrary, however, there 
can only be three motions (see n. 14 below for further discussion). 
7 See also Kosman, The Activity of Being, 70–71. 
8 See Categories 4 for the examples Aristotle gives to each category. 
9 Note that the bifurcation of kinēsis into kinein (moving) and kineisthai (being moved) also 
occurs in Metaphysics IX.6, where Aristotle mentions kinēsis in 1048a25 and kinein and 
kineisthai in 1048a28–29. 
10 Commenting on this passage, Aquinas argues that there cannot be a motion of doing or 
suffering because doing and suffering are already motion (agere et pati sunt motus) and there 
cannot be a motion of motion (In XI Metaphysicorum, lect. 12, n. 2386). 
11 The relation between the terms energeia and entelecheia is too large a topic to explore here, 
so the reader is referred to Menn’s seminal paper ‘The Origins of Aristotle’s Concept of 
Ἐνέργεια’, which I think gets much right. Menn’s interpretation has been challenged by Blair 
(‘Unfortunately, It Is a Bit More Complex’) and Graham (‘The Development of Aristotle’s 
Concept of Actuality’). See Olshewsky (‘Energeia and Entelecheia’, 1–4) for an overview of 
different interpretations. 
12 As Edward Halper puts it, ‘The first actuality…is a potentiality that can be actualized further, 
such as knowledge that is not in use. A first actuality is potentially a second actuality, and is 
thus both potential and actual’ (One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 164). Likewise, 
Kosman writes that ‘a first actuality is a potentiality toward a second actuality’ (‘Aristotle’s 
Definition of Motion’, 51). Cf. Ross, Aristotle’s Physics, 88. 
 
13 Commentators who adopt the traditional terminology agree minimally that Aristotle intends to 
distinguish between first potentiality, first actuality (or second potentiality), and second 
actuality. An interpretation of Metaphysics IX that emphasizes the role of the categories is not 
incompatible with this minimal agreement. See also n. 20 below. 
14 For the most part Aristotle uses the terms change and motion interchangeably, but there is a 
well-known exception in Physics V.1, where Aristotle draws a distinction between the two 
terms, arguing that since motion (kinēsis) is from contrary to contrary, there are four changes 
(metabolai) but only three motions (225b8–9, see also Metaphysics XI.12, 1068a9–10), in 
which case neither generation nor corruption would count as an instance of motion. In most 
other passages, however, the terms kinēsis and metabolē and the phrases archē kinēseōs and 
archē metabolēs alternate without any sign of a distinction in meaning. 
15 See also Beere (Doing and Being, 33–67) on his use of the term ‘power’. Cf. Halper (One and 
Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 286–287, n. 2) and Graham (‘The Development of Aristotle’s 
Concept of Actuality’, 558ff.). 
16 Witt writes that she prefers to ‘use the terminology agent and passive powers, instead of 
active and passive powers, in order to avoid confusing this distinction with the other important 
contrast Aristotle draws between inactive and active powers’ (Ways of Being, 132, n. 9). I adopt 
Witt’s terminology because I share the same concerns. 
17 In two of these passages, Aristotle also talks about doing and suffering well, which are simply 
more specific kinds of doing and suffering.   
18 See also Categories 14, 15a13–14, De Anima I.3, 406a12–13, and Metaphysics XII.2, 
1069b9–10. In the last passage, the connection between the four categories (substance, quality, 
quantity, place) and the four motions (generation/corruption, alteration, growth/diminution, 
locomotion) is made explicit. 
19 Here one may raise the following question: why are doing and suffering treated as two 
different categories if, in fact, they are simply two ways of explaining the same activity from 
different perspectives? While this question is too complex to discuss adequately here, an 
excellent discussion of the subject can be found in Brentano, On the Several Senses of Being in 
Aristotle, 86–89.  
20 Note that the way that I use the term ‘activity’ would correspond to the ‘second actuality’ of 
the traditional terminology. My point is that the locus of this kind of energeia (i.e. the exercise 
of a capacity) are the categories of doing and suffering. In my view, the energeia of substance is 
not a second actuality, and I believe that it is a first actuality, but I also believe that first 
actualities are not confined to the energeia of substance. These are difficult issues that cannot be 
treated in passing, however, so I will not discuss them further here. 
21 See also Beere, Doing and Being, 3–29 and Menn, ‘The Origins of Aristotle’s Concept of 
Ἐνέργεια’, 74. 
 
22 Part of this interpretation—namely, that there are on the one hand the dynamis and energeia 
of motion and on the other hand the dynamis and energeia of substance—is already commonly 
held. However, few scholars have emphasized the role of the categories in their interpretations 
of the kata kinēsin-epi pleon distinction in IX.1 and of Aristotle’s analogy in IX.6. Menn 
mentions their role (‘The Origins of Aristotle’s Concept of Ἐνέργεια’, 95, n. 32 and 105–107), 
but only in passing. Similarly, Averroes, in his ‘epitome’ commentary on the Metaphysics, 
briefly mentions the categorial basis of Aristotle’s analogy in IX.6, but he interprets the analogy 
in a different way (On Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”, 99).  
23 In Metaphysics IX, Aristotle discusses the relation between the capacity for doing or suffering 
and the capacity for doing or suffering well (IX.1, 1046a17; IX.2, 1946b25). An analogue of 
this discussion can be found in Metaphysics V.12, where Aristotle talks about the difference 
between walking and walking well (1019a24–26) and adds in the next sentence that the same 
holds for paschein, from which we can gather that the capacity to walk is a dynamis tou poiein. 
24 Note that there is an important extent to which my understanding of Metaphysics IX is not 
incompatible with the interpretation of the book advanced by Witt, who argues that Aristotle 
illustrates the relationship between dynamis and energeia ‘with two kinds of examples: the 
relationship between an inactive capacity and its active exercise, and the relationship between 
an incomplete substance and a complete (or perfected) substance’ (Ways of Being, 39). To 
acknowledge, as I do, that there is ‘one’ concept of dynamis and ‘one’ concept of energeia that 
apply analogically in different categories is to acknowledge what Witt would call the 
‘ontological’ sense of these terms, in which case Witt’s interpretation of the text is not much 
different from mine, at least in this respect. Similarly, I wouldn’t disagree with Frede, according 
to whom the dynamis and energeia treated in IX.6–7 is not ‘a further, distinct kind’ of dynamis 
(‘Aristotle’s Notion of Potentiality in Metaphysics Θ’, 180) or ‘a distinct, special kind’ of 
energeia (ibid., 182) over and above those already treated in IX.1–5. The point that I have been 
trying to make is that there is an analogical extension of these concepts in different categories, 
in which case I am in no way denying that the analogues enjoy some kind of unity. I discuss this 
issue in a recent paper, where I address the question of what ties together the kinetic and 
non-kinetic variants of dynamis and energeia (‘Aristotle, Heidegger, and the Megarians’, 135–
138). 
25 According to Kosman, walking in the sense of strolling (spazieren) counts as an end-inclusive 
activity (‘Aristotle’s Definition of Motion’, 58), but it should give us pause that this is not 
Aristotle’s own example. For further discussion of this example, see Carter, ‘Heidegger’s Sein 
zum Tode as Radicalization of Aristotle’s Definition of Kinēsis’, 476ff. Cf. Ackrill (‘Aristotle’s 
Distinction between Energeia and Kinesis’, 131–133). 
26 See Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, vol. 2, 251. Halper talks about similar terminological 
inconsistencies (One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 283, n. 206). 
 
27 Beere holds a similar view (Doing and Being, 229). 
28 Aristotle maintains that every motion (kinēsis), as opposed to energeia proper, takes time 
(Nicomachean Ethics X.4, 1174a19). 
29 For example, Halper introduces the energeia-kinēsis distinction with the following words: 
‘Since Aristotle defines actuality through this analogy with motion, and since it and the 
potentiality for it differ from motion and the potentiality for motion, the analogy calls for a 
distinction between motion and actuality’ (One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 209). See 
also Halper, ‘Aristotle on Knowledge of Nature’, 815–818; Kosman, ‘Substance, Being, and 
Energeia’; Gill, Aristotle on Substance, 214–218; and Kosman, The Activity of Being, 73–78. 
30 Gill tries nevertheless to preserve the unity of (i)–(iii) by suggesting that building is not a 
motion (Aristotle on Substance, 224–25). See also Kosman, The Activity of Being, 264, n. 5 and 
the containing paragraph. My own view is that it is a forced interpretation to use the very 
distinction by which Aristotle distinguishes building from seeing to argue somehow that 
building and seeing belong together. 
31 See Makin (Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Θ, 150), Burnyeat (‘Kinēsis vs. Energeia’), and 
Beere (Doing and Being, 226–227) for a detailed discussion of the manuscript evidence for the 
passage on the energeia-kinēsis distinction.  
32 Kosman writes similarly that an activity is either ‘an activity proper or a motion’ (The Activity 
of Being, 71). On another note, it is important to keep in mind that the term energeia also refers 
to energeia epi pleon, which is, however, outside of the genus that we are interested in 
presently. Yet, it is precisely this fact—i.e. that there is an epi pleon version of energeia—that 
explains why Aristotle treats kinēsis as the paradigmatic energeia. According to Kosman, ‘If 
motion is a degenerate kind of ἐνέργεια, it is not clear why Aristotle should have thought it an 
(even putative) paradigm of ἐνέργεια.’ (‘Aristotle’s Definition of Motion’, 59). I think that the 
interpretation advanced in this paper resolves this difficulty: there is both a kinetic and a non-
kinetic version of energeia, and it is the former of these—i.e. energeia in the sense of activity—
that serves as the paradigm. 
33 Note that unlike Kosman, who divides activity into activity proper and motion (The Activity of 
Being, 71), Witt divides motion into ‘incomplete and complete motions’ (Ways of Being, 50), 
but despite the different terminology, the basic idea is the same. 
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